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Abstract—Machine learning has been successfully applied to
complex network analysis in various areas, and graph neural net-
works (GNNs) based methods outperform others. Recently, ad-
versarial attack on networks has attracted special attention since
carefully crafted adversarial networks with slight perturbations
on clean network may invalid lots of network applications, such as
node classification, link prediction, and community detection etc.
Such attacks are easily constructed with serious security threat
to various analyze methods, including traditional methods and
deep models. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that
defense method against network adversarial attack is discussed.
In this paper, we are interested in the possibility of defense against
adversarial attack on network, and propose defense strategies
for GNNs against attacks. First, we propose novel adversarial
training strategies to improve GNNs’ defensibility against attacks.
Then, we analytically investigate the robustness properties for
GNNs granted by the use of smooth defense, and propose
two special smooth defense strategies: smoothing distillation
and smoothing cross-entropy loss function. Both of them are
capable of smoothing gradient of GNNs, and consequently reduce
the amplitude of adversarial gradients, which benefits gradient
masking from attackers. The comprehensive experiments show
that our proposed strategies have great defensibility against
different adversarial attacks on four real-world networks in
different network analyze tasks.
Index Terms—Adversarial network attack, adversarial train-
ing, smoothing defense, smoothing distillation, smoothing cross-
entropy loss.
I. INTRODUCTION
The on-going process of datafication continues to turn many
aspects of our lives into computerised data [1]. In real world,
various data can be modeled as networks, such as social
networks, communication networks, biological networks, traf-
fic networks and so on. Until now, massive tools have been
advocated for social network analysis, and network embedding
method is one of the most successful. Network embedding [2]–
[4], learning representation of the network structure, has shown
promising results in various applications, such as link predic-
tion [3], node classification [5], [6], community detection [7],
social network analysis [8] etc. Since the representation of the
network structure learned by the network embedding methods
will directly determine the performances of downstream tasks,
it has received more attention in the past decades.
For all benefits of the network analysis, the widespread use
of network analysis tools raises legitimate privacy concerns.
For instance, Mislove et al. [9] demonstrated that by analyzing
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Facebook’s social network structure, it is possible to infer
not only otherwise-private information about other Facebook
users, but also the attributes of some users. With the serious
security threat of various attacks triggered by hackers against
analysis method, we are interested in the question: Can in-
dividuals actively manage their connections to evade social
network analysis tools?
Although deep learning methods achieve great success in
many real-world tasks, such as computer vision [10], natural
language process [11] and so on, they are confronted with
security problem [12]. The most typical one is adversarial
attack [13]–[21], i.e., in image classification task, we can add
carefully designed perturbation into an original image to fool
a DNN model by a totally wrong classification result [13].
For privacy protection in network, attention has been paid
to attacks on network analysis methods, in other word, to
conduct adversarial attack to make the analysis methods fail.
We can consider the attack on network analysis models as
an efficient tool of user privacy protection from excessive
network analysis. Besides, we also can take the attacks as
a robustness evaluation tool for those state-of-the-art network
analysis methods. In line with the focus of network analysis
attacks, we describe the network attack methods on three basic
network related tasks.
Link prediction, a classic network network analysis tool,
is capable to benefit a wide range of real-world applications,
such as, recommendation systems [23], [24], network recon-
struction, etc [25]. In link prediction [26]–[29], Zheleva et
al. [26] proposed the link re-identification attack to predict
sensitive links from the released data. Fard et al. [27] in-
troduced a subgraph-wise perturbation in directed networks
to randomize the destination of a link within subgraphs to
protect sensitive links. They further proposed a neighborhood
randomization mechanism to probabilistically randomize the
destination of a link within a local neighborhood [28]. Yu
et al. [29] proposed a target defense strategy against link-
prediction-based methods, which can protect target sensitive
links from being detected by neighbor-based link prediction
methods. In community detection, Nagaraja [30] proposed the
first community deception method, called centrality attack, by
adding links to the nodes of high centrality. Inspired by modu-
larity, Waniek et al. [31] proposed a scalable heuristic method,
namely Disconnect Internally, Connect Externally, which is
implemented by randomly deleting the links between the nodes
in the target community and adding the links between nodes
belong to different communities. Besides, Fionda et al. [32]
proposed a novel community deception method based on the
safeness which is responsible for hiding level evaluation of the
target community by the community detection algorithm.
More interestingly, Zu¨gner et al. [33] proposed the first
adversarial attacks on networks, namely NETTACK, which
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Fig. 1. The visualization of FGA procedure on network embedding of a random target node in Dolphins network. The purple node represents the target node
and the purple link is selected by FGA due to its largest gradient. Except for the target node, the nodes of same color belongs to the same community before
attack. Here, we use DeepWalk [3] to generate a low-dimensional network representations as the input to the visualization tool t-SNE [22]. We find that the
embedding vector of the target node changes a lot even when only one link is changed in the network, indicating the powerful attack ability of FGA.
generated adversarial network iteratively. In each iteration,
it first selected candidate links and features based on their
important data characteristics; then, it defined two scoring
functions, and used the link or feature of the highest score
to update the adversarial network. They further proposed a
principled strategy [34] for adversarial attacks on unsupervised
node embeddings, and demonstrated that the attacks generated
by node embedding have significant negative effect on node
classification and link prediction. Dai et al. [35] proposed a
reinforcement learning based attack method (RL-S2V), which
learns the generalizable attack strategy and only requiring
prediction labels from the target classifier. While network
embedding methods are getting more and more popular in net-
work analysis, their security problem cannot be ignored. Chen
et al. [36] proposed the fast gradient attack (FGA) on network
embedding. They designed an adversarial network generator,
utilizing the iterative gradient information of pairwise nodes
based on the trained GCN model to generate adversarial
network so as to implement the attack. According to the strong
transferability of adversarial attack, they used the generated
adversarial network to attack various network embedding
methods. The visualization of FGA procedure on network
embedding of a random target node in Dolphins network is
shown in Fig. 1, which is an example of powerful attack effect
of adversarial network attack. They further defined the link
prediction adversarial attack problem and put forward a novel
iterative gradient attack [37] based on the gradient information
in trained graph auto-encoder model.
It has been proved that adversarial network attack methods
outperform other network attacks because they are more
concealed with less perturbations and higher attack success
rate [36], [37]. Individual, community and the data publisher
may adopt adversarial network attack as a privacy protection
tool from excessive network analysis. However, every coin has
two sides. There will be serious security threat when the hacker
misuses the adversarial attack to conceal their illegal commu-
nity. For instance, it could disguise Mohamed Atta’s leading
position within the WTC terrorist network [38] by rewiring a
strikingly-small number of connections. Unfortunately there’s
still no reliable defense against the attack. In [35], Dai et al.
sought to use a cheap method for adversarial training (AT),
which simply drops the edges globally at random during each
training step for defense gain. However, in most cases the
random strategy is not good enough for the DNNs when
they face more powerful adversary attacks [33], [36]. Devel-
opment of defense against adversarial attack of network is
inevitable. In this paper, we analyze the possibility of defense
for DNNs against different attacks and compare their defense
cost. Efficient defense will assist counterterrorism units and
lawenforcement agencies to detect criminals and terrorists
based on their increasing reliance of social-media survival
strategies [39], [40].
In this paper, we propose diversified network defense strate-
gies against adversarial network attack. Specifically, we make
the following contributions.
• To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that
network defense against adversarial attack is discussed.
We propose different defense strategies for global and
target adversarial attacks, and test out their efficiency by
extensive experiments.
• We propose four defense strategies to provide diversified
defenses for network. Aiming at global network attack,
we propose global adversarial training to improve the
robustness of DNN, and propose target label adversar-
ial training against target adversarial attack. Besides,
we propose smoothing distillation and smoothing cross-
entropy loss function to implement gradient mask, which
makes the hackers difficult to construct attack via model’s
gradient.
• Comprehensive experiments are conducted to validate
that our proposed defense strategies perform significantly
better than the adversarial training strategy proposed
in [35], in terms of higher Average Defense Rate (ADR)
and lower Average Confidence Different (ACD), on a
number of real-world networks, achieving state-of-the-art
defense effects.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we
introduce our defense methods in details. In Sec. III, we em-
pirically evaluate the defense methods on node classification,
compare with other network attack methods on several real-
world networks, and show the defense results of two special
network defense strategies on all network attack methods. In
Sec. IV, we conclude the paper and highlight future research
directions.
3II. MEDTHOD
A. Surrogate Model
In this work, we focus on node classification employing
the graph convolutional network (GCN) [41] which learns
the hidden layer representations that encode both local graph
structure and features of nodes. We consider a two-layer GCN
model as the surrogate model. A is the adjacency matrix and
A˜ = A+IN is the adjacency matrix of the undirected network
G with the added self-connections. IN is the identity matrix.
D˜ii =
∑
j A˜ij is the degree matrix of A˜. The forward model
of the surrogate model takes the simple form:
Y ′(A) = f(A¯σ(A¯XW0)W1), (1)
where X is a matrix of node feature vectors, A¯ =
D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2 = D˜−
1
2 (A + IN )D˜
− 12 , W0 ∈ RC×H and
W1 ∈ RH×|F | are the input-to-hidden and hidden-to-output
weight matrices, respectively, with the hidden layer of H
feature maps; f and σ are the softmax function and Relu active
function, respectively. Here, the softmax activation function is
applied row-wise.
For node classification, the common training objective of
GCN is to minimize the cross-entropy loss, which can be
defined as follow:
L = −
|Ts|∑
l=1
|F |∑
k=1
Ylk ln(Y
′
lk(A)), (2)
where Ts is the set of nodes with labels, F = [τ1, · · · , τ|F |] is
the category set for the nodes in the network, |F | denotes the
number of categories, Y is the ground true label matrix with
Ylk=1 if node vl belongs to category τk and Ylk=0 otherwise,
and Y ′(A) is the output of the model calculated by Eq. (1).
B. Adversarial Training
Szegedy et al. [42] showed that by training on a mixture
of adversarial and clean examples, a neural network could
be regularized somewhat. Adversarial training for deep neural
model to enhance its defensibility against adversarial attack
has been proved efficient in computer vision applications [13],
[42].
Given an original clean network Gcln with adjacency matrix
A, in this part, we adopt adversarial training for GCN model
to enhance its defensibility against adversarial network attack.
Focus on different types of protected nodes, we propose two
special adversarial training strategies: global adversarial train-
ing that can protect all of nodes and target label adversarial
training that can protect target label nodes. In the proposed
adversarial training, for each training node that have the
same type with protected nodes, we select a pair of nodes
Eij = (vi, vj) based on adversarial network attack, and
θij ∈ {−1, 0, 1} indicates the modification strategy of Eij .
Then, we constantly update the adversarial network Gadv with
all selected target pairs of nodes. Finally, we train the protected
GCN model with final generated adversarial network Gadv .
The detail description of the global adversarial training and
target label adversarial training can be shown as follow:
Global Adversarial Training (Global-AT). Global-AT is
proposed for all nodes protection against adversarial network
attack. We generate an adversarial network Gadv to train
the target model to prove its defensibility of all nodes. In
Global-AT, we update the adversarial network with the links
that selected by adversarial network attack for all nodes in
the training set Ts = [v1, · · · , vm]. For node vt ∈ Ts, the
generation of tth adjacency matrix At of adversarial network
can be described by the following steps.
• Selecting the target pair pf nodes: At first, for node
vt ∈ Ts, we select a pair of nodes Eij = (vi, vj) and its
modification strategy θij based on the adversarial network
attack.
• Updating adversarial network: We use the selected pair
of nodes Eij to update the (t− 1)th adversarial network,
and the adjacency matrix Aˆt of the tth adversarial net-
work is defined as:
Aˆtij = Aˆ
t−1
ij + θij , (3)
where Aˆtij and Aˆ
t−1
ij are the elements of Aˆ
t and Aˆt−1,
respectively.
The pseudo-code for global adversarial training strategy is
given in Algorithm 1.
Target Label Adversarial Training (Target-AT). We pro-
pose Target-AT to protect the target labeled nodes from attack.
Unlike Global-AT, Target-AT only focus on the target labeled
nodes in Ts. For each target labeled node in Ts, we update the
adversarial network with the link that selected by adversarial
network attack.
We consider the adversarial training as maximizing detec-
tion rate when the network is perturbed by an adversary. It
can be interpreted as learning to play an adversarial game, or
as minimizing an upper bound on the expected cost over ad-
versarial samples. We apply the selected nodes to the training
with set in which nodes with ground truth label, adversarial
training can also be seen as a form of active learning, where
the model is able to request labels on novel nodes.
After training the target GCN model with data including
the ground truth labeled novel nodes, the decision boundary
of retraining GCN model, the robustness of the GCN model
to adversarial attack can be improved.
C. Smooth Defense
Adversarial training attempt to classify the target node in
the adversarial network correctly only result in the change of
the distribution of decision boundary. However, in computer
vision task, Szegedy et al. [42] proposed that a smart enough
adversary can always find new adversarial examples to suc-
cessfully attack the target classifier no matter how the decision
boundary changes.
For the DNN models, it is fact that the adversarial attacks
were primarily exploiting gradients computed to estimate the
sensitivity of networks to its input dimensions. Similarly,
in the network, if adversarial gradients are high, crafting
adversarial networks for target node become easier because
small adversarial perturbations will induce high classification
output variations for target. To defend against such adversarial
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Fig. 2. The framework of smoothing distillation. In this model, we train the initial GCN with a softmax output layer at temperature T as first. Then, we
encode training nodes by soft label which is the output confidence of the trained initial GCN model. Finally, we train the distilled GCN with its training
objective function which is composed of soft loss function and original loss function.
Algorithm 1: Training GCN with Global-AT
Input: Original clean network Gcln with adjacency
matrix A, the training set Ts = [v1, · · · , vm].
Output: The classification result.
1 Train the GCN model with Gcln;
2 Initialize the adjacency matrix of the adversarial network
by Aˆ0 = A;
3 for t = 1 to m do
4 Eij ,θij=AdversarialAttack(Aˆ0, vt);
5 Update the adjacency matrix Aˆt by Aˆtij = Aˆ
t−1
ij + θij ;
6 end
7 Train the GCN model with the Gadv that constructed by
Aˆm, and output the classification result;
8 return The classification result.
network attack, one must therefore reduce these variations
around the output confidence, and consequently the amplitude
of adversarial gradients. That is to say, for GCN, we must
smooth the model learned during training by helping the model
generalize better to nodes outside of its training set.
In this part, we design two special smooth defense strate-
gies, which can have a smoothing impact on classification
models learned during training. These two smoothing defense
strategies will be described as follows.
1) Smoothing distillation: Neural networks produce class
probabilities by using a softmax layer. Within the softmax
layer, a given neuron corresponding to a class indexed by
i ∈ [0, · · · , |F |−1] (—F— denotes the number of categories)
computes component ith of the following output confidence
vector Y ′x for the sample x in training set Ts:
Y ′xi =
exp(zxi/T )∑
j exp(zxj/T )
, (4)
where [zx1, · · · , zx|F |−1] are the |F | logits corresponding to
the hidden layer outputs for each of the |F | classes, T is a
temperature that is normally set to 1. Using a higher value for
T produces a softer probability distribution over classes.
In the simplest form of distillation, proposed by Hinton
et al. [?], knowledge is transferred to the distilled model by
training it on a transfer set and using a soft target distribution
for each case in the transfer set that is produced by using the
cumbersome model with a high temperature in its softmax.
Therefore, inspired by distillation, we propose a smoothing
distillation (SD) to suit our goal of improving the robustness of
GCN in the face of adversarial perturbations. The knowledge
extracted by distillation transferred in distilled GCN model to
maintain accuracy comparable with the original GCN model
can also be beneficial to improve the generalization capabilities
of the distilled GCN model outside of their training nodes and
therefore enhances their resilience to perturbations.
In SD, different with original distillation, we keep the same
architecture to train both the original GCN model as well as
the distilled GCN model. The framework of SD model is
illustrated in Fig. 2, and the detailed description of training
procedure of SD will be shown as follow:
• Training the initial GCN model. Given the training set
Ts = [v1, · · · , vm] and its hard label matrix Y , at first,
we train the initial GCN model with a softmax output
layer at temperature T . Based on Eq. 1, we set Y ′′ is the
output confidence of the trained initial GCN model.
• Encoding training nodes by soft label. Instead of using
hard label matrix Y , we use the soft label Y ′′ to encode
the belief probabilities over the label for all training
nodes.
• Training the distilled GCN model. Based on the soft
label matrix Y ′′ and hard label matrix Y for the training
set Ts, we train the distilled GCN model, which has
the same architecture as the initial GCN model. For this
distilled GCN model, its training objective function Lall
is composed of the soft loss function Ls and original loss
function L, and can be defined as:
Lall =
Ls
T 2 + 1
+
T 2L
T 2 + 1
(5)
where soft loss Ls can be described as follow:
Ls = −
|VL|∑
l=1
|F |∑
k=1
Y ′′lk ln(Y
′
lk(A)). (6)
In the soft loss Ls, we also use a softmax function with
temperature T , but after the distilled model has been
trained it uses a temperature T = 1.
5TABLE I
THE DEFENSE RESULTS OF VARIOUS DEFENSE STRATEGIES AGAINST TWO ADVERSARIAL NETWORK ATTACKS ON MULTIPLE NETWORKS.
Datasets Attack ADR(%) ACDSCEL SD Gloabl-AT Target-AT AT Ensemble SCEL SD Gloabl-AT Target-AT AT Ensemble
Polblogs
FGA 25.38 20.71 24.89 62.41 0.00 23.15 -0.309 -0.259 -0.299 -0.631 -0.066 -0.284
NETTACK 28.93 17.36 24.15 22.39 1.45 28.99 -0.714 -0.744 -0.743 -0.748 -0.678 -0.744
Average 27.16 19.04 24.52 42.40 0.72 26.07 -0.511 -0.502 -0.521 -0.690 -0.372 -0.514
Cora
FGA 31.07 12.37 28.59 76.26 -0.52 34.43 0.019 -0.072 0.04 -0.596 0.536 0.082
NETTACK 20.51 18.62 21.84 12.87 3.47 22.05 -0.013 0.017 -0.030 0.075 0.200 -0.043
Average 25.79 15.50 25.21 44.57 1.48 28.24 0.003 -0.027 0.005 -0.261 0.368 0.020
Citeseer
FGA 31.68 6.84 31.22 72.31 -2.90 25.49 -0.001 -0.033 0.021 -0.493 0.544 0.115
NETTACK 5.72 4.29 5.27 4.45 1.96 6.36 0.338 0.314 0.319 0.340 0.368 0.314
Average 18.70 5.56 18.24 38.38 -0.47 15.92 0.169 0.141 0.17 -0.076 0.456 0.214
2) Smoothing cross-entropy loss function: Based on the
above analysis, we can find that label smoothing during model
training can help the model generalize better to nodes outside
of training nodes, i.e. improve the robustness of model. Then,
inspired by the model regularization method [43], we propose
a smoothing cross-entropy loss function (SCEL), which en-
courages the GCN to return a high confidence on the true label
while a smoothing confidence distribution on false labels for
each node. The smoothing cross-entropy loss function Lsmooth
can be defined as follow:
Lsmooth = −
|VL|∑
l=1
|F |∑
k=1
Yˆlk ln(Y
′
lk(A)), (7)
where Yˆ is a smoothing matrix with Yˆlk = 1 if node vl belongs
to category τk and Yˆlk = 1|F | otherwise, VL is the set of nodes
with labels, F = [τ1, · · · , τ|F |] is the category set for the
nodes in the network, |F | denotes the number of categories,
and Y ′(A) is the output of the model calculated by Eq. (1).
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Our experimental environment consists of i7-7700K
3.5GHzx8 (CPU), TITAN Xp 12GiB (GPU), 16GBx4 memory
(DDR4) and Ubuntu 16.04 (OS).
A. Datasets
In the task of node classification, each node in a network is
assigned a label, and the following three networks are used.
Their basic statistics are summarized in TABLE II.
• Pol.Blogs: The Pol.Blogs network is compiled by Adamic
and Glance [44]. This network is about political leaning
collected from blog directories. The blogs are divided into
two classes. The links between blogs were automatically
extracted from the front pages of the blogs. It contains
1,490 blogs and 19,090 links in total.
• Cora: This network contains a number of machine-
learning papers of seven classes [45]. The links between
papers represent the citation relationships. It contains
2,708 papers and 5,429 links in total.
• Citeseer: Citeseer is also a paper citation network with
the papers divided into six classes [45]. It contains 3,312
papers and 4,732 citation links in total.
TABLE II
THE BASIC STATISTICS OF THE THREE NETWORK DATASETS.
Dataset #Nodes #Links #Classes #Train/Validation/Test
Pol.Blogs 1,490 19,090 2 121/121/1,248
Cora 2,708 5,429 7 267/267/2,174
Citeseer 3,312 4,732 6 330/330/2,652
B. Experiment settings
There are three adversarial attack methods, FGA [36],
NETTACK [33] and RL-S2V [35]. Before the experiments of
defense, we evaluate the performance of the three adversarial
network attacks with average attack success rate (ASR) on
three datasets, i.e., the ratio of the successfully attacked nodes,
i.e., leading the mislabelled of the nodes, versus all target
nodes, by changing one links for each target node. The average
ASR of FGA is 66.27%, the average ASR of NETTACK is
49.18%, and the average ASR of RL-S2V is 9.17%. Since
the performance of RL-S2V is much worse than that of other
adversarial network attacks, it is meaningless to evaluate the
defense effect of defense strategies against RL-S2V, i.e., in
this section, we only focus on the defense effect of defense
strategies against FGA and NETTACK, which are briefly
described as follows.
• FGA [36]. FGA designs an adversarial network genera-
tor, utilizing the iterative gradient information of pairwise
nodes based on the trained GCN model to generate
adversarial network so as to realize the network attack.
In FGA, we only consider to attack the links around the
target nodes, i.e., remove existent links of the target nodes
or add new ones to them.
• NETTACK [33]. NETTACK generates adversarial net-
work iteratively. In each iteration, it selects candidate
links based on the degree distribution; then, it defines
a scoring function, meaning the confidence loss of the
target node in the trained GCN model when a certain
link is changed; after that, it utilizes the scores of the
candidate links to update the adversarial network.
In order to evaluate the proposed defense strategies, we
compare our methods with the adversarial training (AT) which
was proposed by Dai et al. [35]. In AT, we simply drops
the edges globally at random during each training step for
defense. Further more, in order to testify the effectiveness of
our propose defense strategies, we propose a ensemble model,
called Ensemble. In Ensemble, we use Global-AT, SD and
6SCEL to improve the robustness of GCN model at the same
time. In particular, we set the temperature T = 10 in SD and
Ensemble model.
C. Defense Results
We use the following metric to measure the defense effec-
tiveness on the nodes set Ns which are classified correctly
before attacked in test set.
• ADR: The average defense rate, i.e., the ratio of the
difference between the ASR of attack on GCN with
and without defense, versus the ASR of attack on GCN
without defense. The higher ADR corresponds to the
better defense effect.
• ACD: The average confidence different, i.e, the average
confidence different of the nodes in Ns before and after
attacked, which can be defined as follow:
ACD =
1
|Ns|
∑
vi∈Ns
CDi(Aˆvi)− CDi(A), (8)
CDi(A) = max
c6=Ri
Y ′i,c(A)− Y ′i,Ri(A), (9)
where Aˆvi is the adversarial network of target node vi, Ri
is the real label of target node vi, Y ′ is the output of the
model calculated by Eq. 1. The lower ACD corresponds
to the better defense effect.
Defense results. In this part, we compare our proposed
defense strategies with the AT proposed by Dai et al. [35] on
three common networks. All of the defense results are shown
in Table I, where we can see that the Target-AT and Ensemble
outperform other defense strategies in all of the cases, in terms
of higher ADR and lower ACD. In particular, since Target-
AT only focus on target label nodes, it seems to be fairer
to compare AT with other four defense strategies. In fact,
exclude Target-AT, Ensemble model which is composed of
SCEL, SD and Global-AT, performs better than other defense
strategies in most of cases. Surprisingly, in Table I, AT has
little defense effect against the adversarial network attacks,
even has negative defense effect when the adversarial network
attack is FGA on Cora dataset and Citeseer dataset.
Classification accuracy. Fig. 3 shows the classification
result of the GCN model trained without defense and with
different defense strategies. From Fig. 3, we can find that, in
most of cases, the performance of GCN trained with most of
defense strategies are as good as the performance of GCN
trained without defense. In particular, the performances of
GCN with SD and Target-AT are poor on the Cora and
Citeseer network datasets. In SD, the knowledge extracted by
distillation has a little negative effect on the classification of
distilled GCN model, but improves generalization capabilities
and robustness of the distilled GCN model. Since Target-AT
only focus on target label nodes in the network, the decision
boundary of GCN trained with Target-AT changes to protect
target label nodes and ignores other label nodes, i.e., the
classification of GCN trained with Target-AT may perform
poor in some cases.
Target label nodes defense. To better compare the de-
fense effect of various defense strategies, the defense result
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Fig. 3. The classification accuracy of the GCN model with different defense
strategies on three network datasets.
of various defense strategies against FGA and NETTACK
on the nodes in different labels are shown in Fig. 4 and
Fig. 5. At first, we can find that these results are almost
consistent with those in all nodes defense, i.e., for target label
nodes defense, the Target-AT and Ensemble outperform all
the defense strategies in most of cases. Then, we can find
that AT is perform poorest in all defense strategies in most of
cases, which has lowest ADR and highest ACD whatever the
adversarial network attack is. From the ADR value of AT, we
can find that the improvement scale of AT is not significant.
Surprisingly, though Target-AT has a little negative impact on
the classification accuracy of the GCN model, the Target-AT
outperforms all the defense strategies in most of cases when
the adversarial network attack is FGA, and also perform well
against NETTACK.
D. Defense effect on community deception and visualization
To better show the defense effect of various defense strate-
gies, in this part, we use community detection methods [46]–
[48] to detect target nodes in the adversarial networks which
are generated by the GCN model with or without defense.
Finally, we also visualize the adversarial networks which are
generated GCN with and without defense, and visualize their
network representation.
In this experiment, we first use GCN to generate the
adversarial network. For network embedding methods, we
generate node embedding vectors, based on which we get the
community detection results by adopting the simple K-means
method. We also use a classic community detection method,
Louvain [49], to detect target nodes in the adversarial network.
The network embedding methods and the classic community
detection method used in this part are shown as follow.
• DeepWalk [3]: DeepWalk first transforms the network
into node sequences by random walk, then uses it as input
to the Skip-Gram model to learn representations.
• node2vec [2]: node2vec develops a 2nd-order biased
random walk procedure to explore neighborhood of a
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Fig. 4. Target label nodes defense results with different defense strategies against FGA.
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Fig. 5. Target label nodes defense results with different defense strategies against NETTACK.
node, which can strike a balance between local properties
and global properties of a network.
• Louvain [49]: A modularity-based method which can
generate a hierarchical community structure by compress-
ing the communities.
The experiment datasets in this part are shown as follow.
Their basic statistics are summarized in Table IV.
• PloBook: This network represents co-purchasing of
books about US politics sold by the online book-
seller [50]. In this network, nodes represent books about
US politics sold by the online bookseller Amazon.com,
and two nodes are connected if the corresponding two
books were co-purchased by the same buyers. There
are 105 books and 441 links in total, and the books
belongs to three communities, namely liberal, neutral and
conservative.
• Dolphins: This social network represents the common
interactions observed between a group of dolphins in a
community living off Doubtful Sound, New Zealand [51].
There are 62 dolphins and 159 links in total, and the
dolphins are partitioned into two groups by the temporary
disappearance of dolphin number.
Defense results. The defense results on community detec-
tion are shown in TABLE. III, where we can see that the
results in TABLE. III are almost consistent with those in node
classification, i.e., for each community detection methods on
each community datasets, Target-AT and Ensemble outperform
than other defense strategies in most of cases, and all proposed
defense strategies have more significant improvement on de-
fense effect than AT whatever adversarial network attack is.
8TABLE III
THE DEFENSE RESULTS OF VARIOUS DEFENSE STRATEGIES AGAINST TWO ADVERSARIAL NETWORK ATTACKS ON COMMUNITY NETWORKS.
Datasets Attack Model ADR(%)SCEL SD Gloabl-AT Target-AT AT Ensemble
PolBook
FGA
DeepWalk 23.20 42.40 54.00 69.04 2.40 62.56
node2vec 47.77 27.60 34.71 61.74 11.07 67.93
Louvain 70.50 29.67 14.26 57.84 0.00 71.92
Average 47.16 33.22 34.32 62.87 4.49 67.47
NETTACK
DeepWalk 47.69 13.85 32.00 68.92 -5.38 50.77
node2vec 54.67 32.01 13.60 54.14 7.93 50.42
Louvain 48.84 43.89 24.92 53.50 -3.14 50.50
Average 50.40 29.92 23.51 58.85 -0.20 50.56
Dolphins
FGA
DeepWalk 21.92 41.44 50.00 70.00 2.40 60.96
node2vec 40.00 20.00 38.52 71.10 20.00 60.00
Louvain 54.44 55.54 11.12 33.80 0.00 54.44
Average 38.79 38.99 33.21 58.30 7.47 58.47
NETTACK
DeepWalk 48.16 9.12 32.64 63.68 6.40 48.80
node2vec 47.19 4.29 32.34 60.20 9.24 50.50
Louvain 48.84 43.89 24.92 63.50 -3.14 50.50
Average 48.06 19.10 29.97 62.46 4.17 49.93
Original network of Dolphins
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Selected link
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Target
Target
Target
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Fig. 6. The visualization of FGA under different defense strategies on network embedding of a random target node in Dolphins. The purple node represents
the target node and the purple link is selected by our FGA due to its largest gradient. Except for the target node, the nodes of same color belongs to the same
community before attack.
TABLE IV
THE BASIC STATISTICS OF THE TWO COMMUNITY NETWORK DATASETS.
Dataset #Nodes #Links #Classes #Train/Validation/Test
PolBook 105 441 3 13/12/80
Dolphin 62 159 2 10/10/42
For AT, it has little defense effect on the adversarial network
attack, even has negative defense effect when the adversarial
network attack is NETTACK.
Visualization. To better show the defense effect of various
defense strategies, in this part, we visualize the networks
generated by the attack with and without defense and their
representations, as shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, respectively.
In particular, in most cases, since Ensemble model perform
better than other defense strategies except Target-AT, we only
focus on Ensemble and AT in this part. Here, we use the low-
dimensional network representations learned by DeepWalk [3]
as the input to the visualization tool t-SNE [22]. We find that
the embedding vector of the target node changes a lot even
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Fig. 7. The visualization of FGA under different defense strategies on network embedding of a random target node in PolBook. The purple node represents
the target node and the purple link is selected by our FGA due to its largest gradient. Except for the target node, the nodes of same color belongs to the same
community before attack.
when only one link is changed in each network. From these
two figures, we also find that FGA attack under Ensemble
defense have a poor attack effect, while the attack effect of
FGA attack under AT defense also is as good as the attack
effect of FGA without defense which makes the embedding
vector of the target node changes a lot.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present the first work on defense against
adversarial attack on network, and propose various special de-
fense strategies for GNNs against adversarial network attacks.
At first, we propose two novel adversarial training strategies,
called Global-AT and Target-AT, to improve GNNs’ defen-
sibility against attacks. Then, we investigate the robustness
properties for GNNs granted by the use of smooth defense,
and propose two special smooth defense strategies: smoothing
distillation and smoothing cross-entropy loss function. Both
of them are capable of smoothing gradient of GNNs, and
consequently reduce the amplitude of adversarial gradients,
which benefits gradient masking from attackers. Based on
our extensive experiments we can conclude that our proposed
strategies have great defensibility against different adversarial
attacks on various real-world networks in different network
analyze tasks.
Studying the robustness of GNNs for networks is an im-
portant problem. Our future work includes developing more
effective defense algorithms against adversarial network attack
and trying to propose robustness network embedding methods
that are more robust to the adversarial network attacks.
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